popular bellicosity thus illuminates the political constraints on democratic war-making. If vicarious retribution following 9/11 affected U.S. public support for war against Iraq, then a future terrorist attack or national injury also might create opportunities for leaders to pursue strategically unrelated war agendas. Vicarious retribution also could affect war decisions more directly, if-as a growing literature contends-retribution and anger sometimes influence leaders' own thinking. 8 Even if such effects are rare, they potentially could cause costly wars, counter-retaliation, and further cycles of violence.
The next section discusses the causes of vicarious retribution and its consequences for foreign policy opinion, explains why vicarious retribution was likely to have affected post-9/11 U.S. opinion, and reviews previously available evidence on this hypothesis. The following section provides new evidence for the vicarious retribution account, and the article concludes by discussing implications for the roles of emotion, values, and identity in foreign policy opinion and international conflict.
Vicarious retribution and support for war
Whereas ordinary retribution punishes those who committed a crime, vicarious retribution targets a particular class of non-perpetrators-those who share a common identity or group membership with the actual culprits. 9 Vicarious retribution research builds on extensive social psychology findings that people who identify strongly with a group react with outrage and desires for revenge following a serious crime against fellow group members. 10 Rather than examining the causes of intergroup anger, however, this research has focused on how perceived group categorization affects aggressiveness toward uninvolved targets. Although this literature has addressed neither the rationality of vicarious retribution nor its international manifestations, there are good reasons to expect that under certain conditions it can generate non-prudential public support for military force.
Psychological mechanisms
One of the main findings of prior vicarious retribution research is that animosity and punishment toward the offenders' entire group is heightened by perceptions of that group as homogenous, cohesive, or both. Because an outgroup's perceived homogeneity and cohesiveness have been found to have convergent consequences for intergroup emotions and attitudes, social psychologists use the single term "entitativity" to describe both attributes.
11
One can imagine entitativity perceptions, if accurate, providing some strategically useful information. The perceived similarity of group members, for example, might extend to their propensity for aggressive behavior. In addition, the more cohesive the outgroup, the more likely its members endorse or support each other's actions, and the more likely that aggressive members can be deterred by threats against their uninvolved brethren. Indeed, there is some 10 Reviewed by Diane M. Mackie and Eliot R. Smith, "Intergroup Emotions," in APA Handbook of Personality and Social Psychology, Volume 2: Group Processes, ed. Mario Mikulincer, et al. (Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association, 2015) .
11 Donald T. Campbell, "Common Fate, Similarity, and Other Indices of the Status of Aggregates of Persons as Social Entities," Behavioral Science 3, no. 1 (1958): 14-25; David L. Hamilton, Steven J. Sherman, Sara A. Crump, and Julie Spencer-Rodgers, "The Role of Entitativity in Stereotyping," in Handbook of Prejudice, Stereotyping, and Discrimination, ed. Todd D. Nelson (New York: Taylor & Francis, 2009). evidence from small group research that vicarious retribution is intended to send a "don't mess with us" signal to the perpetrator or other potential antagonists. 12 However, people often overestimate outgroup entitativity. Cognitive biases promote oversimplified perceptions of group boundaries and diversity. 13 Anger, even if generally helpful to rational decision-making, tends to distort judgment and behavior in ways that result in excessive and misdirected punishment. 14 For example, feelings of anger aroused following a serious crime against one's group heighten stereotypical perceptions of social groups and prejudice, even when the anger is unrelated to a judgment task at hand (i.e., "incidental anger").
15
In addition, people who have been personally insulted or offended, when they cannot take revenge against the perpetrator, sometimes lash out in displaced aggression against uninvolved bystanders. Constituent and Concomitant Biological, Psychological, and Social Processes, ed. Michael Potegal, Gerhard Stemmler, and Charles Spielberger (New York: Springer, 2010 "prosecutorial mindset" that leads to harsher judgments and greater punitiveness toward completely unrelated suspects and offenders. 17 Vivid and emotionally arousing crime-scene details providing no incriminating evidence also increase the likelihood of a guilty verdicts. 18 These effects have been experimentally demonstrated in mainly interpersonal and intragroup social contexts. But they likely occur in intergroup contexts as well, because intergroup emotions parallel ordinary social emotions for those who identify strongly with the affected group. 19 Just as imminent personal threats elicit fear for one's own safety, imminent threats to fellow group members elicit genuine fear for the group's safety, even when one is not personally endangered. Similarly, offenses against one's ingroup, regardless of whether one is personally affected, arouse anger and aggressiveness toward the offending outgroup, which are attenuated by successful intergroup retribution. 20 Beyond identification with the ingroup, factors affecting anger in interpersonal and social contexts-e.g., the degree and intent of harm done and the victim's strength relative to that of the offender-typically have analogous effects on intergroup anger as well.
21
There exists little experimental evidence bearing on whether anger at particular outgroup offenders causes specifically counter-productive aggressiveness toward the offenders' kin. But incidental intergroup emotions have "spillover" effects affecting judgments and decisions that are unrelated to the triggering stimuli, similar to those occurring in intragroup contexts. 22 It is also suggestive that displaced aggression is more likely against bystanders who resemble the perpetrator of an unpunished offense, in experiments that minimize reputational incentives to show toughness. 23 This effect's similarity to vicarious retribution suggests common underlying psychological mechanisms.
The potentially counter-productive nature of vicarious retribution gains further plausibility from ordinary people's frequently non-instrumental motives for punishing or supporting the punishment of actual transgressors. Research on criminal punishment judgments and cooperation games shows that people often favor punishing offenders for the sake of "justice" or "just deserts" rather than for security or material gain. Sometimes they even will pay to punish, whether to assuage the victim's self-esteem, to satisfy the principle of "an eye for an eye," or simply to satisfy a felt need to aggress following a humiliating injury. 24 Cost-benefit calculations are also often curtailed in ordinary people's thinking about intergroup conflicts over "sacred values," including avenging a humiliating injury. 25 
Implications for foreign policy opinion
Nationalism provides a powerful source of ingroup identification, generating strong emotional reactions on behalf of one's nation. 26 This makes it at least plausible that external crimes against one's nation would sometimes boost support for the use of force against uninvolved foreign states. Such a hawkish reaction would be consistent with limited-information pragmatism theories of foreign policy opinion if it is intended to send a deterrent message to would-be enemies, but not if it is driven by the conflation of foreign actors, a displaced wish for justice, or some other anger spillover effect.
27
Vicarious retribution provides a compelling explanation for non-instrumental public support for attacking innocent civilian citizens within an offending state. Following Japan's defeat in 1945, for example, 13% of Americans wanted to "kill all Japanese" and 23% wished that Truman had dropped "many more" atomic bombs "before Japan had a chance to surrender." 28 More recently, over 40% of U.S. citizens preferred a nuclear attack killing 100,000
Iranian civilians to a near-unconditional Iranian surrender, following an Iranian attack on U.S.
forces in a hypothetical conflict in the Persian Gulf. Vicarious retribution should shape public opinion in several ways. Individual differences in perceptions of the outgroup as entitative should affect aggressiveness toward uninvolved members of the perpetrator's broader identity group. In other words, the effect of anger and revenge on support for force against uninvolved outgroup members should be magnified by the perceived entitativity of the outgroup (i.e., the perceived entitativity hypothesis). 33 Attributions of blame to the perpetrators' group due to its perceived entitativity also should sustain anger over the original offense even after punishing the actual perpetrators (i.e., the anger persistence hypothesis).
Given some degree of perceived outgroup entitativity, those who feel greater anger and desires for revenge toward the perpetrator will generally express greater hostility toward the perpetrator's outgroup (i.e., the anger-outgroup hostility hypothesis) and greater support for using military force against uninvolved members of the perpetrator's group (i.e., the angervicarious retribution hypothesis). Feelings of anger are likely to further bias perceptions of entitativity, due to heightened categorical thinking and motivated reasoning. 34 In theory, that could have recursive feedback effects, with anger at the perpetrators broadening the attribution of blame to the perpetrators' kin. 35 Thus, hostility toward the outgroup, once aroused, will itself heighten support for war against its uninvolved members. This would be manifested in an 33 Throughout this article we equate revenge and retribution, and lump them together with anger, because we lack theoretical and empirical reasons to differentiate them here. 34 Bulletin 22, no. 12 (1996) indirect effect of anger and desires for revenge against the actual perpetrator on war support, via hostility to the outgroup (i.e., the hostility diffusion hypothesis).
Although not specifically tested here, additional hypotheses spring from the mechanisms assumed to cause vicarious retribution. For example, individual differences affecting anger toward the perpetrators, such as exposure to information about offenses (especially the harm caused and intent) and predispositions to react angrily to provocation, should also affect vicarious retribution. In addition, an offense against a country will increase its public's hostility and aggressiveness toward uninvolved foreign states, leaders, and peoples sharing at least superficially similar traits with the perpetrator (these might be described as national injury hypotheses).
Prior evidence for vicarious retribution in U.S. public support for war against Iraq
The hypothesized sources of vicarious retribution were present in spades in post-9/11 America. The attacks' horrific lethality and destruction of national symbols, al Qaeda's top ringleaders having escaped punishment, a national mantra of "never forget," and extensive media coverage combined to generate intense and prolonged public outrage. Although this anger ebbed somewhat over time, on the first anniversary of 9/11 two thirds of the public reported still feeling "very angry at the people who did this."
36 Even several years later, President Barack Obama prioritized hunting down bin Laden not just to take "a monstrous leader off the battlefield," but also because of the importance of "righting an unspeakable wrong" and "healing a nearly unbearable wound in America's heart." Although data is lacking on this point, it seems probable that more U.S. citizens knew that Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein were Arab and Muslim than that they held radically opposing religious and political beliefs and despised each other. Public dislike of Saddam Hussein ever since his 1990 invasion of Kuwait made Iraq a prominent potential lightning rod.
Many citizens were probably uncertain whether the costs of toppling the Iraqi regime outweighed the potential benefits of stopping its alleged pursuit of WMDs. Such propitious conditions make this episode a useful initial probe of vicarious retribution's impact on public support for war.
Although falling well short of a compelling case, previously available evidence is largely consistent with a vicarious retribution account. The post-9/11 surge in public belligerence toward Iraq, followed by a gradual decline, is consistent with the national injury hypothesis. 38 Thermometer scale ratings of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Yassir Arafat, and Saddam Hussein all declined to a significant degree between 1998 and 2002, while the average ratings for non-Arab and non-Muslim states and leaders held steady over the same time period. 39 Moreover, the correlations observed between war support and anger over 9/11, as well as that between between war support and punitive dispositions, are consistent with the anger-vicarious retribution hypothesis. 40 In addition, after 9/11 over two thirds of the U.S. public agreed that "the Muslim world considers itself at war with the U.S." and 25-39% said they had an "unfavorable opinion of
Islam." Between a seventh and a quarter of the public said their feelings about Arab Americans had worsened due to the attack, a third said that Arab Americans were relatively sympathetic to terrorists, and 40% agreed that "the attacks on America represent the true teachings of Islam."
41
Hate crimes and economic discrimination against American Arabs and Muslims spiked nationwide after 9/11. 42 Although we have not found repeated measures of prejudice toward
Arab Americans before and after 9/11, data from other countries reveal increased prejudice toward Arabs following major terror attacks.
43
Two additional findings are consistent with a vicarious retribution account. First, nearly a decade after 9/11, Americans expressed higher levels of support for force against an unidentified Muslim nuclear proliferator than an otherwise-identical Christian one. 44 Second, feelings that the Iraq War would avenge 9/11, measured around the time that the war began, correlated with prejudice against Muslims measured eight years later. 45 Because it is difficult to imagine a mechanism by which retributive satisfaction from invading Iraq would have shaped prejudice against Muslims, it seems more likely that both had been affected by citizens blaming the "Muslim world" for 9/11. However, this finding could have been due to a longstanding antipathy to Islam or to implicitly evoked attitudes about Iran, rather than to vicarious retribution. 45 Liberman and Skitka, "Revenge in US Public Support for War," 648. Jennifer Lerner and colleagues have shown that anger, including anger over 9/11, tends to diminish appraisals of future unrelated risks, whereas fear has the opposite effects. 47 Authors' analysis of data from the 1998 and 2002 Chicago Council on Foreign Relations surveys described in n. 39. 48 On the prevalence and potential consequences of these beliefs, see Kull, Ramsay, and Lewis, "Misperceptions, the Media, and the Iraq War" and Althaus and Largio, "When Osama Became Saddam." For evidence that these misperceptions were less important than might be expected had they represented firm beliefs, see Liberman and Skitka, "Revenge in US Public Support for War."
49 This study manipulated anger and fear through a reflection exercise but did not measure attitudes about Iraq; Lerner et al., "Effects of Fear and Anger." 50 Huddy, Feldman, and Cassese, "Distinct Political Effects." both angrier and more bellicose, resulting in a spurious correlation between these reactions.
51
Heightened post-9/11 perceptions of the Iraqi threat or halo effects from the perceived terrorist threat also might have accounted for some of these longitudinal and cross-sectional findings.
Past research has frequently found associations between threat perceptions, anger, prejudice, and belligerence, including in post-9/11 public opinion. were relatively angry and vengeful after 9/11 favored war in part because they were disproportionately hostile toward Arabs and Muslims. attitudes about Iraq related to anger over 9/11 and anti-Arab-Muslim feeling, except through vicarious retribution processes.
Anger at the Terrorists and Arab-Muslim Entitativity
Testing whether the perceived entitativity of the outgroup magnified the effect of anger and revenge on support for force against uninvolved outgroup members requires measures of anger or revenge over 9/11, support for war against Iraq, and perceptions of Arab-Muslim entitativity. For the first of these variables we use September 2001 questions asking how strongly respondents felt "angry," "outrage," "hatred," and a "desire to fight back" during "the first few hours after learning the news about the terrorist attacks." As can be seen in Figure 1 , Americans felt extremely angry in the immediate aftermath of the attacks and continued to report high levels of anger in response to similar questions posed in January 2002. 63 Although the four items within each wave were presented to respondents within a larger, randomly sequenced series on varied emotional reactions to the attacks, they loaded strongly on single first-wave and second-wave dimensions in a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) model. 64 The limited number of items and their strong inter-correlations preclude distinguishing between anger, hatred, and desires for retribution in our data analysis, and anyway we expect these reactions to have very 63 The January 2002 items were the same except for a change in the wording of the stem to "How do you feel, right now, about the events of September 11?" The two measures were distinct but strongly correlated (r=0.72); see Online Appendix [## provide URL here ##] Tables A1 and A2. 64 Wording and CFA details for all the multi-item measures are provided in the Online Appendix, Tables A1-A2. As an indication of the internal reliability of all the multi-item measures in our analysis, additive scales from the same items have a Cronbach's Alpha of 0.79 or higher. Compared to raw score scales, using factor scores measures the underlying factor more accurately by weighting each item according to how strongly it reflects that factor. similar effects on vicarious retribution. 65 We thus measure September 2001 anger at the perpetrators using the factor scores from the CFA model and label this scale Anger9/01.
66
[ Figure 1 18-27. 66 Although the January 2002 measure of anger correlated more strongly with war support and negative feelings about Arabs and Muslims, which were also measured in that wave, using independent variables measured prior to dependent ones lends support to inferring causal direction from observed correlations. 67 The random error entailed by reliance on a single-item measure makes our tests more conservative than comparable tests using multi-item scales.
68 Leonie Huddy, Nadia Khatib, and Theresa Capelos, "The Polls-Trends: Reactions to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 ," Public Opinion Quarterly 66, no. 3 (2002 : 418-450; Everts and Isernia, "Polls-Trends," 291-295. 69 Interspersing these among items on a variety of other groups limited artificial consistency due to questionorder effects.
anger, fear, and disgust, such feelings would have been worsened mainly by perceived affinities or similarities with the actual perpetrators. Moreover, there is no obvious reason why feelings about Arabs and Muslims-apart from the entitativity perceptions underlying them-would have magnified the effects of angry reactions to 9/11 on war support. On the contrary, to the extent that emotions are represented in the measure they would tend to obscure rather than simulate the hypothesized effect of perceived Arab-Muslim entitativity.
Although a majority of the public reported unchanged feelings about the three groups, 28% said they felt "more negative" or "much more negative" about Arab Americans, and 35%-37% said so about Palestinians and about Islamic or Middle Eastern peoples. Moreover, respondents who reported worsened views of one group were very likely to do so about the other two as well. Of those who said they felt worse about "Islamic or Middle Eastern" peoples, for example, 77% said this about Palestinians and 65% did so about Arab Americans. In contrast, among those who reported their feelings about Islamic or Middle Eastern peoples had not worsened, just 17% expressed more negative feelings about Palestinians and only 7% did so about Arab Americans. All three items load highly on a common factor in the CFA model, and the factor scores from that model provide our proxy measure of perceived Arab-Muslim entitativity, which we call Anti-Arab for short.
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To differentiate retributive from protective motivations linked to anger, our analysis controls for perceived threat and fear of terrorism, as well as their own interactions with AntiArab. We measure the perceived terror threat using January 2002 questions about how "worried" respondents were about "future terrorist attacks," "getting infected with anthrax," and 70 The only other item about foreigners in this series, one on "Israelis," loads weakly (0.48) on this factor when added to the CFA model, indicating that the factor measures anti-Arab-Muslim feelings rather than just xenophobia or ethnocentrism.
"other kinds of bioterrorism." Questions that ask about "worry" and personal vulnerability (salient in the anthrax item) tend to elicit more anxiety than do those asking about "concern over" or the "likelihood of" terror attacks on the nation. 71 However, also controlling for a clean measure of fear, based on January 2002 items asking how "frightened" and "vulnerable" people felt when thinking about 9/11, should foreground the effects of objective threat perception in Terror Worry's estimated effects on war support. 72 The perceived terrorist threat-controlling for fear-ought to have heightened aggressiveness toward Iraq and fear-controlling for threatought to have diminished it. As expected for anger, both effects should have been stronger among those who regarded the Arab-Muslim world as monolithic. [ Figure 2 goes about here] 71 Huddy et al., "Threat, Anxiety." 72 The anxiety in Terror Worry is evident by its high correlation with Fear (r=0.77), which exceeds the correlation of r=0.60 between anxiety and a more objective measure of national threat reported in Ibid. Despite this correlation and the three interaction terms, multicollinearity is not a problem in the regression model (mean VIF=2.69; maximum VIF=4.00). 73 The interaction is significant at p<0.05 two tailed; for full results see Model 1 of Online Appendix Table A3 .
The total effect of Anger9/01 on war support, moreover, may have been larger than that indicated by Figure 2 , which holds Anti-Arab constant. If, as we argue below, anger increased Anti-Arab in addition to being channeled by it, and Anti-Arab itself heightened support for war, then anger also had an additional indirect effect on war support.
The other panels in Figure 2 show that Anti-Arab also moderated the effects of threat perceptions and fear. Terror Worry and Fear had no effect on belligerence toward Iraq among those low in Anti-Arab, i.e., for those who regarded Arabs and Muslims as diverse and fragmented. In contrast, among those high in Anti-Arab, who presumably perceived a more monolithic Arab-Muslim world, Terror Worry predicts greater hawkishness toward Iraq, and 
Anger at the Terrorists and Animosity toward the Arab-Muslim World
We now turn to the question of whether public anger at the 9/11 perpetrators affected broader perceptions and feelings about Arabs and Muslims, which in turn aggravated support for 76 The measure is built from post-9/11 feelings about "Americans as a whole," "American political leaders," "police," and "fire fighters," from the same series of items as Anti-Arab.
overall anger-outgroup hostility hypothesis by exploiting the fact that Anti-Arab measures worsened feelings about Arabs and Muslims as well as their perceived entitativity. Anti-Arab correlates more strongly with anger than with fear, and thus appears to measure anger at Arabs Table A2. 78 As Andrew Hayes observes, "there are many real-life processes in which things caused by X also influence the size of the effect of X on Y measured well after X. But M would have to be causally prior to Y in order for this to be possible, implying that M could also be construed as a mediator if M is caused in part by X but also influences Y in some fashion;" Introduction to Mediation, Moderation, and Conditional Anti-Arab in turn strongly predicts war support, including the same controls. Figure 4 plots the coefficients from two ordered probit models of Iraq War, a baseline model and another adding Anti-Arab as a predictor. According the latter model, a 10 th -to-90 th percentile increase in
Anti-Arab for otherwise average citizens increases the estimated probability of expressing "very much" support for war from 0.33 to 0.57.
[ Figure 4 goes about here]
The data are also consistent with Anti-Arab partially mediating Anger9/01's effect on Iraq War. Controlling for Anti-Arab attenuates the estimated effect of Anger9/01, as can be seen from comparing the Anger9/01 coefficients across the two models. For a more precise indirecteffect estimate, we fit a path model with Iraq War and Anti-Arab assumed to be endogenous to Anger9/01 and the other control variables, and Iraq War also specified to be endogenous to AntiArab. The estimated indirect effect of Anger9/01 on Iraq War via Anti-Arab is equal to 34% of Anger9/01's total effect.
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These results are consistent with anger at the 9/11 perpetrators having increased support for war against Iraq in part by arousing a broad hostility toward Arabs and Muslims, including 80 See Model 2 of Online Appendix Table A4 . 81 This estimate is significant at p<0.0001 based on bootstrapped standard errors; see Online Appendix A5 for detailed results.
Arab Americans and others obviously uninvolved in 9/11. Mediation tests do not establish causal direction among observed variables, but the fact that Anger9/01 was measured four months before Anti-Arab and Iraq War makes its estimated effect more likely to reflect an exogenous one. In addition, the control variables included in the models minimize omitted variable bias to the extent possible with the available data.
Might longstanding prejudices, rather than animosity aroused by the terror attacks, account for Anti-Arab's correlations with Anger9/01 and Iraq War? Although we lack a pre-9/11 measure of anti-Arab/Muslim attitudes or any data on ethnocentrism to bring to bear on this question, there are three reasons for skepticism. First, it seems unlikely that only ethnocentrists and those who already disliked Arabs and Muslims felt indignant over such a uniquely heinous and dramatic crime as the 9/11 attacks. Second, if longstanding anti-Arab/Muslim prejudice accounted for Anti-Arab's correlation with anger at the terrorists, then Anti-Arab should correlate just as strongly with anger measured at different points in time. But Anti-Arab correlated more strongly with the January 2002 measure.
82 Third, the questions used to measure Anti-Arab asked about specifically how feelings had changed due to 9/11. Although it is possible that prejudiced individuals exaggerated such changes, it seems unlikely that Anti-Arab reflects only prior prejudice.
The time frame of the data examined here, before the Bush Administration began selling war against Iraq, should limit the impact on our findings of heuristic cue taking from elite discourse. But one can probe this possibility further by examining whether more educated citizens, who are generally more aware of political discourse, expressed feelings and attitudes 82 The correlations with Anger9/01 and January 2002 anger are r=0.29 and r=0.43 respectively; for additional bivariate correlations, see Online Appendix Table A2. consistent with mainstream or polarized cue taking. 83 If elites expressed anger, anti-ArabMuslim feeling, and war support, then these also would have been more widely echoed by politically aware citizens, whereas a divided elite would have generated ideological or partisan polarization among the politically aware.
If elites did in fact provide one-sided messages of anger at the terrorists, hostility against Arabs and Muslims, and support for attacking Iraq, these were not reflected in Anger9/01, AntiArab, or Iraq War. As Figure 5 shows, education did not increase any of these key variables in the population at large. In addition, more educated conservatives were not angrier, more hostile to Arabs and Muslims, or more belligerent toward Iraq than less educated ones, results that are problematic for a two-message, elite polarization effect. Conservatives did express greater war support and more negative feelings about Arabs and Muslims than did liberals, but these gaps were no greater among more educated citizens. The only result consistent with two-sided heuristic cue taking is the lower level of anger over 9/11 expressed by educated liberals.
[ Figure 5 goes about here]
Admittedly, the sensitivity of these tests is limited by using education as a proxy for political awareness and by the unusual intensity of post-9/11 media coverage and public attentiveness, which might have overcome the ordinary difference in political awareness associated with education. But given the limited administration and media discourse on Iraq prior to the time when the second wave of the survey was fielded, it seems unlikely that the evidence for vicarious retribution revealed here resulted from public cue taking.
Additional evidence of the independence of Anger9/01 from Administration discourse can be seen from how little this variable changed in surveys completed before and after President Bush's address to Congress on September 20 th . Bush identified the al Qaeda culprits and declared a "war on terrorism" for the first time in that widely watched speech, and he employed rhetoric that was tailor-made to arouse outrage. 84 But as can be seen in Figure 6 , public anger was not affected by the speech, and if anything was ebbing gradually over time. 85 In theory, popular anger and desires for revenge already may have been shaped by Bush's brief promise to bring the "evildoers" to "justice" on the evening of September 11. But a study analyzing text messages sent over the course of that day found that public anger shot up dramatically in the daytime, before Bush gave his first brief remarks that evening.
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[ Figure 6 goes about here]
Discussion
The findings presented here lend new support to the idea that shared Arab-Muslim identities channeled U.S. public outrage at the 9/11 perpetrators toward the Iraq regime. Citizens who were relatively angry immediately following the terror attacks were relatively belligerent toward Iraq four months later, especially if they also viewed Arabs and Muslims as monolithic.
This effect was compounded by worsened feelings about Arabs and Muslims in general.
These results control for worry about the terror threat, partisanship, ideology, and demographics. Although it would have been better to control for a more emotion-neutral measure of threat perception, controlling for worry about a threat is arguably better for isolating 84 Loseke, "Examining Emotion as Discourse." 85 A pre/post t-test reveals a decrease significant at p=0.07. 86 Mitja D. Back, Albrecht C. P. Küfner, and Boris Egloff, "The Emotional Timeline of September 11, 2001 ," Psychological Science 21, no. 10 (October 2010 ): 1417 -1419 the effects of anger than is controlling only for fear or anxiety, as previous studies have done. 87 We lack data on perceptions of Iraqi complicity and dangerousness, and the costs and benefits of war, but none of these factors provide a satisfying explanation of our main findings.
Cleaner measures of perceived Arab-Muslim entitativity, pre-9/11 measures of outgroup derogation and support for force, and data on beliefs Iraq's connection to al Qaeda would have been useful for our analysis. Nevertheless, the weight of evidence suggests that many U.S.
citizens blamed Arabs and Muslims writ-large for 9/11 and favored attacking Iraq as a form of vicarious retribution.
This helps to fill gaps in our understanding of how stereotyping and anger affected popular support for war against Iraq. First, it appears that vicarious retribution accounts for at least some of the previously observed correlations between punitive predispositions, outrage over the terror attacks, and belligerence toward Iraq.
88 Second, it helps explain the prior finding that many citizens who thought that Iraq had not been involved in 9/11 also said that attacking Iraq would help satisfy their desire to avenge 9/11. Future research should try to provide more precise and discriminating tests of vicarious international retribution, to probe its underlying psychological mechanisms, and to investigate its moderators and boundary conditions. Regarding mechanisms, it remains unclear whether angry citizens support vicarious retribution to send a "don't mess with me" message, a more strategic motive, or because they blamed the entire group for the crimes of individual members. The latter mechanism would be an intergroup analogue of the "prosecutorial mindset," in which unrequited desires for revenge against elusive perpetrators result in blaming of others who are more easily punished. 92 Given the potency of motivated reasoning in political attitudes, perhaps anger and a desire to lash out at symbolic stand-ins for the elusive Osama bin Laden accounts for some of the suspicions that Americans expressed about Iraqi complicity in 9/11.
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Culture and the expected costs of war likely condition whether an injury to the nation arouses vicarious retribution. Democracies possessing retributive cultures appear to be more war-prone because their leaders can whip up support for force more easily, by highlighting or exaggerating a target state's aggressive or wrongful behavior. 94 In addition, given popular sensitivity to U.S. casualties and the expected security benefits of force, vicarious retribution is likely to affect support for war most when its costs are expected to be low, ambiguous, or balanced by potential gains. Vicarious retribution may have been unusually potent after 9/11, due not only to intense public anger, but also to U.S. military superiority over Iraq and public uncertainty about the consequences of regime change. This combination of factors may have created a rare "perfect storm" of vicarious retribution.
That said, it is easy to imagine terrorists once again managing to inflict a horrific attack on a powerful country, and again proving difficult to locate and punish. In such circumstances, political leaders might be able to exploit popular vicarious retribution in order to win public consent for war against uninvolved targets. In the case of post-9/11 United States, public Table A3 of the Online Appendix. Table A3 and Models 3 and 4 of Table A4 in the Online Appendix. Superscripted notes indicate response options: a) not at all, slightly, moderately, much, very much; b) much more positive, more positive, no change, more negative, much more negative (reversed for the Pro-American items); c) not at all, slightly, moderately, a lot, very much; d) strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, agree, strongly agree. Apart from the Terror Worry items, all items randomized beneath each question stem, and intermixed with additional items not shown here (except for RWA). Estimated by the Mplus 7.1 program's weighted-least-squared means-and varianceadjusted estimator, to minimize bias from categorical and non-normal data (Byrne, 2012; Muthén & Muthén, 2012 
RWA
The way our country can get through future crises is to get back to our traditional values, put tough leaders in power, and silence trouble makers spreading bad ideas.
.90 Our country will be great if we honor the way of our forefathers, do what authorities tell us, and get rid of the 'rotten apples' who are ruining everything.
.87 Our country will be destroyed someday if we do not smash the perversions eating away at our moral fiber and traditional beliefs.
.88
Our country desperately needs a mighty leader who will do what has to be done to destroy the radical new ways and sinfulness that are ruining us. .80 The "strongly disagree" and "disagree" categories of the dependent variable were combined to satisfy the parallel regression assumption. Figures are unstandardized ordered probit coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses; estimates employ sampling weights and listwise deletion of missing data.
a In preliminary models, Hispanics and "other" were not significantly different from "White, non-Hispanic," and so these categories were collapsed in the rest of our analyses. 
